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Abstract
We examine empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and
the components of the Mirrlees framework, with a focus on inherent inequality and
government’s redistributive preferences. We have constructed our income distribution
variables from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, which provides information
on both factor and disposable incomes. Our redistributive preference measure is
constructed using the optimal tax formula for which we have collected data from various
sources. In addition to traditional linear specifications, we use flexible methods to
allow nonlinearities because pre-specified functional forms are not easy to justify in
empirical investigations of the optimal tax framework. We study 14 advanced countries for
approximately four decades and find support for the Mirrlees model: There is a positive
relationship between factor-income inequality and the extent of redistribution. We also
find a link between our redistributive preference measure and the extent of redistribution.
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1. Introduction
The post-war history of income inequality in advanced countries can be divided, at
least roughly, into two phases. From 1945 to about the mid-1980s, pre-tax inequality, or
the inequality of factor incomes (incomes from earnings and capital), decreased at least
in part because of a reduction in skilled/unskilled wage differentials and asset inequality.
The second phase occurred from the 1980s onward, when inequality reversed course and
increased. For the 1970s and the above-described latter period we have evidence from the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. This database provides data on both factor
and disposable incomes for a number of advanced countries over the past four decades,
which facilitates the study of the extent of redistribution. The difference between the
factor-income Gini and disposable-income Gini is an often-used measure of the overall
redistributive effect of taxes and transfers. These types of difference measures are also
used in the current study to discuss the evolution of the extent of redistribution.
For example, Immervoll and Richardson (2011) studied OECD countries using the
LIS data. They reported that governmental redistribution has become less effective in
compensating increasing inequalities since the 1990s. Moreover, top income shares have
increased in many advanced economies over the past three decades (Atkinson & Piketty,
2010), and top tax rates on upper-income earners have declined significantly in many
OECD countries during this period (Piketty et al., 2014). Economists have formulated
several hypotheses about the causes of increasing inequality, but the explanations are not
fully compelling. For example, Atkinson et al. (2011) emphasised that it is very diffi-
cult to account for these figures using the standard labour supply/demand explanation.
Hence, the role of social policies and progressive taxation should not be dismissed in these
discussions.
Figure 1 illustrates changes that have taken place in factor-income inequality and
redistribution during a period of 20 years, from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. The
figure implies a positive association, but there are some outliers. For example, in France
inequality decreased during this period, but there was more redistribution. Thus, it
seems that factor-income inequality does not fully explain the extent of redistribution in
the plotted countries.
There is now a considerable body of empirical literature seeking to explain the ob-
served patterns of redistribution. Here we outline some of this literature. The starting
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Figure 1: Illustration of evolution from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s: we plot the change in factor-
income Gini against the change in the extent of redistribution over this period; change is defined as the
difference between two observations. The Gini coefficients are expressed as percentages, and the extent of
redistribution is defined as RDrelative = 100(Ginifactor −Ginidisposable)/Ginifactor. The corresponding
factor-income Ginis of the 14 countries are provided in Table 1. Data source is the LIS database, and
more information can be found in Appendix A.
point for seeking the determinants of the extent of redistribution, both across countries
and over time, is most commonly some model of the political process, originating with
Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). Persson and Tabellini
(2002) provide a survey. A key element in this literature is the political mechanism – the
median voter theory – through which greater inherent inequality leads to greater redistri-
bution. The often-cited model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) shows that the larger the gap
between mean and median income (that is, inequality), the larger the scale is of income
redistribution favoured by the median voter. However, some authors have suggested that
redistribution is greater the less inherent inequality there is (e.g. Peltzman, 1980; Persson,
1995; Lindert, 2000). Peltzman (1980) attempts an explanation that greater inequality
links to the lower classes’ ability to demand redistribution towards themselves.
Empirical studies have provided mixed evidence on the association between inequality
and demand for redistribution (e.g. Perotti, 1996; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001; Finseraas,
2009). For example, Alesina et al. (2001) provided a distinct example of the ‘paradox of
redistribution’: a simple comparison of the United States and Europe showed that Europe
had lower pre-tax inequality and more redistribution. They pointed out that the extent
of altruism – which may be different in different societies – may show in the demand
for redistribution. In addition, Georgiadis and Manning (2012) showed that implications
resembling altruism may arise when individuals are uncertain about their future incomes –
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thus, individuals may be concerned about tax rates at different points in the distribution.
Earlier, Benabou and Ok (2001) discussed the ‘prospect of upward mobility’ hypothesis –
individuals may consider outcomes in those parts of the income distribution where they
expect to end up in the future.
Numerous recent empirical studies on inequality and redistribution have utilised the
LIS database. For example, both Milanovic (2000) and Scervini (2012) confirmed the
positive association between inequality and redistribution, but Milanovic (2000) found
less support for the median voter hypothesis in explaining redistribution decisions. Mi-
lanovic (2010) dicusses the critique that his earlier study has received and, in particular,
emphasises the median voter hypothesis as only one possible mechanism between initial
inequality and redistribution. Recently, Luebker (2014) emphasised behavioural aspects
in understanding the extent of redistribution. He did not find support for the Meltzer–
Richard hypothesis, but he provided some evidence that actual preferences are associated
with redistributive outcomes.
The approach in this study is novel and different from those above because our start-
ing point is the optimal tax framework developed by Mirrlees (1971). This model has
dominated the economics of redistributive taxation for the past 40 years, and three ele-
ments of the model are useful for our purpose. First is the concept of inherent inequality,
reflecting, among other things, skilled/unskilled wage differentials, asset inequality and
social norms. Unlike the original Mirrlees model on labour income, we adopt the view
that the taxation is based on the comprehensive income (i.e. taxing the sum of labour
and capital income). In fact, in many countries most ordinary capital income, such as
interest from a standard savings account, is taxed jointly with labour income. Moreover,
in the case of the Nordic dual income tax model it can be difficult to distinguish between
labour and capital income in practice. It also turns out, as noted by Saez and Stantcheva
(2016), that in the case of the comprehensive income taxation the optimal tax formula
takes the same form as in Mirrlees (1971) and Saez (2001).1 If there is no intervention by
the government, the inherent inequality will be fully reflected in the disposable income.
However, if the government wants to intervene – as seems to be the case in developed
1Let H be the cumulative distribution of the total income y and h(y) the associated density (assuming
a linearized tax system at point y). Then using the Saez (2001) procedure optimal nonlinear income tax
on total or comprehensive income satisfies ty1−ty =
(1−ϕ(y))
εy
(1−H(y))
yh(y) where ϕ(y) is the average welfare
weight on individuals with total income higher than y′ and εy is the weighted average elasticity.
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countries – it will find the second component of the Mirrlees model, the egalitarian objec-
tives of the government. In addition, if the government tries to redistribute income from
high-income people to low-income people, there will be incentive and disincentive effects.
In other words, redistribution policy is a product of circumstances and objectives.2
Kanbur and Tuomala (1994) showed that the optimal income tax/transfer system be-
comes more progressive when inherent inequality increases, taxing the better off at higher
rates to support the less well off. Thus, one of the policy responses in view of inherent
inequality should be a greater willingness to redistribute through the tax and transfer
system. Correspondingly, if inherent inequality decreases, governmental redistribution
decreases.
Interestingly, at the same time as the large growth in top income shares over the
past few decades, many advanced countries have shifted the tax burden from the top to
further down in the distribution. Numerical results in Tuomala (2016) suggest that this
shift in tax burden cannot be justified by the standard Mirrlees model, which embodies
conventional assumptions about inequality aversion and the trade-off between equity and
efficiency. Both in utilitarian and maximin cases, an appropriate response to rising in-
equality is a shift towards a more progressive income tax system. For more details, see
Tuomala (2016).
Previously, Tanninen and Tuomala (2005) discussed how some of the basic features of
redistribution can be explained through the Mirrlees model. They examined the relation-
ship between inherent inequality and the extent of redistribution by utilising the LIS data
for a number of OECD countries over two to three decades. They found that redistri-
bution is positively associated with inherent inequality. However, their empirical results
were based on the assumption that the degree of espoused egalitarianism has remained
constant over the period considered. There is now some recent individual-country-level
evidence that there could have been a shift in norms, causing governments to become
less willing to finance transfers and to levy progressive taxes, leading to reductions in the
extent of redistribution. One could argue, in line with Atkinson (1999), that these kinds
of changes have been episodic rather than time-trend and are therefore rather difficult to
2There is another strand of optimal redistribution literature (see Mirrlees, 1974; Varian, 1980; Tuomala,
1984, 1990) stressing the social insurance role of redistributive taxation. In this framework, an increase
in variability of income would also increase the optimal degree of progressivity because it increases the
insurance value of progressive taxation.
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justify, for example, in the context of median voter models. Thus, we focus here also on
the role of the egalitarian objectives of government, which is an important component of
the Mirrlees model.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current empirical study is the first to ex-
plore inequality, redistributive preferences and the extent of redistribution in the Mirrlees
framework. The utilised LIS database provides data on both factor and disposable in-
comes for a number of advanced countries over the last four decades, and the current study
focuses on 14 advanced economies. In addition to using Gini coefficients, we also utilise
percentile ratios in measuring inequality and the extent of redistribution. Moreover, we
have collected data from various sources to construct a measure of government’s taste for
redistribution. We adopt the inverse-optimum approach and more specifically we utilise
the top tax rates to reveal the shape of implicit welfare weights.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 depicts the data, empirical specifi-
cation and methods. The current paper employs, in addition to traditional linear models,
flexible methods to address the issue of chosen functional forms. Namely, the shapes of
the relationships are not known beforehand. Section 3 provides our empirical results,
including sensitivity checks. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Empirical approach
2.1. Specification and data
The relationship that we test can be expressed as follows:
RD = h(If , γ, ;x),
where RD is the extent of redistribution measured in terms of the difference between
factor-income inequality (If ) and disposable-income inequality (Id). Our main results are
presented for a relative measure; that is, RDI;relative = 100(If − Id)/If . In the sensi-
tivity analysis, we also discuss the alternative case where the extent of redistribution is
measured in absolute terms. Function h includes three components, If , γ and , that re-
flect the ingredients of the Mirrlees model, and they are inherent inequality, government’s
redistributive preferences and elasticity of taxable income, respectively. In addition, x
denotes control variables.
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We begin by describing our inequality data. Most of the median voter studies have
utilised data sets including the largest possible number of countries all around the world
(e.g. the panel data set of Deininger and Squire, 1996). However, such data sets have
many problematic features that have been discussed in detail by Atkinson and Brandolini
(2001). As Milanovic (2000) pointed out, there is no proper distinction between inherent
income and redistribution (for different definitions of income see Atkinson et al., 1995).
Fortunately, this distinction can be taken into account in the LIS data.
We have calculated inequality measures for two income concepts – factor and dispos-
able household income – from the LIS database. We refer to the difference between these
two measures as redistribution. LIS has harmonised microdata from (mostly) high- and
middle-income countries, and the data are organised into different waves according to the
date of the data. In addition to the LIS historical data (Wave 0), we use the data from
Wave I around 1980 to Wave IX around 2013. The lengths of different waves are not
uniform. Moreover, some countries may have more than one observation within the same
wave.3 We use all available LIS data for which data on our other variables are available,
and the resulting data set is not balanced.
Table 1: Levels of factor-income inequality in 14 countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s.
LIS Wave II LIS Wave IV LIS Wave VI
around 1985 around 1995 around 2004
Ginif P90/P50f (year) Ginif P90/P50f (year) Ginif P90/P50f (year)
Australia 43.7 2.16 (1985)* 47.9 2.34 (1995) 48.3 2.42 (2003)
Canada 40.8 2.16 (1987) 44.9 2.29 (1994) 47.7 2.42 (2004)
Denmark 41.7 1.86 (1987)* 44.7 2.02 (1995)* 45.0 2.00 (2004)
Finland 38.9 1.89 (1987)* 48.1 2.36 (1995) 47.5 2.28 (2004)
France 50.7 2.46 (1984)* 49.2 2.52 (1994) 48.4 2.43 (2005)
Germany 44.3 2.09 (1984) 46.2 2.25 (1994) 50.2 2.46 (2004)
Ireland 51.2 2.75 (1987) 49.5 2.39 (1995) 50.1 2.53 (2004)
Italy 42.6 2.18 (1986) 47.9 2.47 (1995) 50.8 2.56 (2004)
Netherlands 48.0 2.24 (1987)* 46.7 2.14 (1993)* 46.3 2.13 (2004)
Norway 36.6 1.86 (1986)* 42.6 1.93 (1995) 45.5 2.12 (2004)
Spain 43.5 2.25 (1985) 51.0 2.71 (1995) 45.4 2.39 (2004)
Sweden 43.4 2.01 (1987)* 49.8 2.39 (1995) 47.0 2.19 (2005)
United Kingdom 50.8 2.57 (1986) 54.3 2.78 (1995) 53.3 2.76 (2004)
United States 46.2 2.47 (1986) 49.1 2.66 (1994) 49.3 2.74 (2004)
Data source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). More information can be found in Appendix A.
* This year’s observation cannot be used in empirical models due to missing information in other variables.
We focus on the 14 advanced countries that are listed in Table 1. In addition to study-
ing the traditional Gini coefficients, we investigate the development of the percentile ratio
3For more information about the LIS waves, visit: http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/
lis-database/documentation/list-of-datasets/.
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P90/P50. Both measures are much used in inequality studies and provide somewhat com-
plementary information. The Gini index is an overall measure of inequality, reflecting the
behaviour of the whole income distribution, and being particularly sensitive to asymme-
tries in the central part of the distribution. Percentile ratios focus on two specific sections
of the income distribution, providing an idea of how close (or distant) they are from each
other. The P90/P50 ratio gives the 90th percentile relative to the median, focusing more
on disparities at the top half of the distribution. The table illustrates that over the sample
period the inequality of factor incomes has risen in most countries.
Figure 2 shows the development of the extent of redistribution (RDGini;relative) in the
countries under investigation. The countries are categorised into three groups to provide
a concise but readable illustration. The categorisation is the following: Anglo-Saxon
(Australia, Canada, Ireland, the UK and the USA; in main result models N = 44), Nordic
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; in main result models N = 20), and Continental
European (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain; in main result models
N = 41). The figure shows that the extent of redistribution has increased modestly in
some countries. Thus, it appears that the redistributive role of government has corrected
for some of the increase in inherent inequality. A corresponding figure of our alternative
measure RDP90/P50;relative is in Appendix B (Figure B.6).
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Figure 2: Evolution of the extent of redistribution when redistribution is measured in relative terms:
RDGini;relative (14 advanced countries, unbalanced data, years 1967–2013). Calculations based on LIS
database. More information can be found in Appendix A.
How do we measure preferences for redistribution? There is a growing number of stud-
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ies trying to reveal social or distributional preferences behind tax/transfer policy. Those
studies start from the existing tax and transfers system and reverse-engineer it to obtain
the underlying social preferences. Earlier contributions using this method are by Chris-
tiansen and Jansen (1978) and Ahmad and Stern (1984). Recently, detailed micro data on
incomes and corresponding marginal tax rates have become available to study the social
preferences implicit in tax–benefit systems. One of the first studies using micro data was
by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012). They consider the revealed social preferences of
the French tax–benefit system. Spadaro et al. (2015) in turn consider the revealed social
preferences of the tax–benefit systems for all European countries using European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions data. Lockwood and Weinzierl (2016) apply
the inverse-optimum approach over time to the United States tax policy and show that
the implicit weights decline slowly with income. Jacobs et al. (2017) use this method
to find the redistributive preferences of political parties implicit in the reform propos-
als combining the reform proposals with micro data on the income distribution and the
elasticity of the tax base in the Netherlands. Bastani and Lundberg (2017) use Swedish
administrative panel data and provide a detailed characterisation of the income distribu-
tion, especially at the top. Bargain et al. (2014a) estimate labour supply elasticities from
micro data and characterise the redistributive preferences embodied in the welfare sys-
tems of 17 EU countries and the United States under the assumption of optimality. They
find that social welfare weights are always positive though not monotonically declining
for low income groups. They further find that there are significant differences in social
welfare weights over income between groups of countries (the United States vs. Continen-
tal/Nordic Europe vs. Southern Europe), with rather similar social welfare weights over
income within groups of countries.4
In our empirical applications, we try to reveal government’s taste for redistribution
(γ) using the optimal top tax formula τ = (1− γ)/(1− γ + α)⇔ γ = 1− τα/(1− τ),
where τ is top income tax rate, α is Pareto-Lorenz coefficient and  is elasticity of taxable
income (Saez, 2001). Our data on top income tax rates and Pareto-Lorenz coefficients
are collected from various sources, such as Piketty et al. (2011, 2014) and the World
Inequality Database (2017); see Appendix A for more detailed information. Moreover, no
4For additional related literature see, for example, Kleven and Kreiner (2006), Bargain et al. (2014b)
and Hendren (2017).
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Figure 3: Evolution of redistributive preferences (14 advanced countries, unbalanced data). In calculating
the γ (gamma) values, we have assumed constant elasticity of  = 0.20. Data are constructed from multiple
sources, and more information is provided in Appendix A.
reliable panel data on behavioural responses  exist, so we have investigated our results
with some ‘reasonable’ values from the prior literature. In our preferred specifications
we assume  = 0.20. For example, Saez et al. (2012) suggest that aggregate elasticities
of taxable income are between 0.1 and 0.4. Moreover, in our empirical applications we
consider only values γ ≥ 0. This restriction to nonnegative values limits the number
of observations in our empirical models: when  = 0.20, we get N = 105. Figure 3
describes the evolution of government’s taste for redistribution in the 14 countries of
this study. Higher γ reflects lower redistributional preferences in society. According to
Figure 3, government’s preferences to redistribute have decreased in many countries. In
addition, we tried three alternative assumptions in calculating values for γ: these cases
were  = {0.10, 0.15, 0.25}, and they are briefly discussed in the sensitivity checks.
Finally, our control variables are share of government employment, dependency rate,
unemployment rate, trade union density and openness.5 Summary statistics and a com-
plete list of data sources and definitions are provided in Appendix A.
5It has been argued that a larger government is ‘needed’ in more open economies. Rodrik (1998) gives
an explanation that open economies are more subject to external shocks and that larger redistribution
provides insurance and more stable income for individuals. In addition, the authors of the current study
acknowledge that full assessment of the extent of redistribution should also take account of various
publicly provided services at less than market value. These are considerable in Nordic countries. Many
of these items – health care, education and social services – are very extensive.
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2.2. Estimation method
We do not impose linearity into all our empirical models. In our preferred speci-
fications, we allow all continuous covariates to enter flexibly so that potentially wrong
functional forms would not bias our results. Our estimation approach is based on penal-
ized cubic regression splines although we acknowledge that there are numerous alternative
approaches to flexible modelling, such as kernel estimation.6 Moreover, due to small sam-
ple size, we assume an additive structure instead of a fully nonparametric one.7 The
chosen method is accessible as there is a connection to traditional parametric models –
traditional linear models are a special case. Moreover, there are ready-made statistical
packages that can be utilised in the analysis. To estimate our additive models we use the
established R software package ‘mgcv’, which has previously been utilised in economics
studies on varying topics.8
Additive models provide a flexible framework for investigating the relation between
inequality and redistribution. This study follows the approach presented in Wood (2006).
The basic idea is that the model’s predictor is a sum of linear and smooth functions of
covariates:
E(Yi) =X∗i θ + f1(x1i) + f2(x2i) + f3(x3i) + ...
In the above presentation, Yi is the response variable (extent of redistribution),X∗i is a row
of the model matrix for any strictly parametric model components, θ is the corresponding
parameter vector and f• are smooth functions of the covariates, x•.
The flexibility of these models comes at the cost of two problems. First, one needs to
represent the smooth functions f in some manner. One way to represent these functions
is to use cubic regression splines, which is the approach adopted in this study. A cubic
regression spline is a curve constructed from sections of cubic polynomials that are joined
together so that the resulting curve is continuous up to the second derivative. The points
6Li and Racine (2006) describe nonparametric methods extensively, with the focus on kernels.
Ahamada and Flachaire (2013) provide a concise overview of nonparametric methods.
7Additive models are a special case of generalized additive models (GAMs). GAMs were introduced
by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986, 1990). They present a GAM as a generalized linear model where some
of the covariates can enter the model in linear form, and some terms are smooth functions of covariates.
This study is restricted to a special case: it uses an identity link and assumes normality in errors, which
leads to additive models.
8For example, Greiner and Kauermann (2008), Ordás Criado et al. (2011), Bose et al. (2012) and
Berlemann et al. (2015) apply (generalized) additive models.
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at which sections are joined (and the end points) are the knots of the spline, and these
locations must be chosen. The spline can be represented in terms of its values at the knots.
Second, the amount of smoothness that functions f will have needs to be chosen. Overfit
is to be avoided and, thus, departure from smoothness is penalized. The appropriate
degree of smoothness for functions f can be estimated from the data by, for example,
maximum likelihood, which is the chosen approach in this study for its robustness.
The package ‘mgcv’ has an automatic choice in the amount of smoothing and wide
functionality.9 The relationship between the covariates and the response can be described
graphically. Confidence bands for the model terms can be derived using Bayesian methods,
and approximate p-values for model terms can be calculated. Models can be compared
using information criteria such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC). For further
details, see Appendix D and Wood (2006).
3. Results
3.1. Main results
In this subsection we provide some traditional linear models’ results (OLS with dummy
variables) and compare them to more sophisticated additive models’ results. The additive
models can be stated as:
RDI;relative = θ0 + f1(If ;it) + f2(γ{};it) + f3(government employmentit)
+ f4(dependencyit) + f5(opennessit) + f6(unemploymentit)
+ f7(unionit) + f8(t) + ui + vit,
where i refers to a country and t to year, and θ0 is the constant term. In our main
analysis, the extent of redistribution (RD) is studied in relative terms as we discussed in
Section 2.1. Functions f are smooth functions that are described using penalized cubic
regression splines. Fixed country effects are denoted by ui (traditional dummy variables),
and the vit are traditional error terms. The fixed country effects should take into account
factors that stay constant over time within each country.
9The results in this study are obtained using the package ‘mgcv’, which includes a function ‘gam’.
Basis construction for cubic regression splines is used. The maximum likelihood method is used in the
selection of the smoothing parameters. The identifiability constraints (due to, for example, the model’s
additive constant term) are taken into account by default. More details can be found in Wood (2006)
and the R project’s web pages (http://cran.r-project.org/).
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The additive model above describes the most flexible specification that is studied, and
other specifications are special cases of it. In the traditional models all terms (functions
f) are linear, but the additive models allow all functions f to be nonlinear with no pre-
specified functional form. However, the additive models may also have some linear terms if
the data suggest a linear structure. Thus, linear terms are reported for the additive models
if linearity was suggested in the initial stage of model fitting. In reporting our results,
graphical illustrations are used for nonlinear terms. In comparison, the interpretation of
linear terms is straightforward, and these terms are not plotted.
Table 2 reports our main results. The information criteria show that the additive mod-
els fit the data better than the corresponding traditional models. However, in many cases
the traditional and additive models give qualitatively similar information regarding the
variables of interest. First, Ginif is positively associated with the extent of redistribution
(RDGini;relative), but models (2) and (4) show that the relationship may be more complex
than a linear association; see the change in the slope of the function in the topmost plots,
(a) and (b), in Figure 4. The percentile ratio P90/P50f also correlates positively with the
extent of redistribution in the upper half of the distribution (RDP90/P50;relative). Second,
the taste for redistribution (γ) is in linear, negative association to the extent of redis-
tribution; linear association is found in all the models in Table 2. These findings accord
qualitatively with the Mirrlees model. We can also see that the main results for If and
γ are not sensitive to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables: the signs of the
slopes do not change after adding controls.
Moreover, we find that government employment is statistically significantly and posi-
tively linked with the extent of redistribution; see also plots (d) and (e) in Figure 4. We
also find that our empirical models are not able to capture all changes in RDI;relative over
time: the shape of f(year) is shown in plots (i)–(k) in Figure 4. This implies that even
the broadest models, (4) and (8), do not capture all time-varying factors that relate to
the extent of redistribution.
3.2. Sensitivity checks
The remainder of this section provides information about our results’ sensitivity. First,
we investigate our findings’ robustness with respect to the chosen elasticity parameter.
Second, we investigate the sensitivity of our findings to leaving some countries out of the
sample. Third, we discuss our results when we change the specification so that the same
13
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explanatory variable (inequality measure) is not used to construct the dependent variable
(redistribution). Finally, we use an alternative way to measure the extent of redistribution
to check if this affects our main conclusions.
Measuring the government’s taste for redistribution (γ) is not an easy task, and for
this reason, we tested alternative values for the elasticity (). The above results were for
the case γ{=0.20} (N = 105). In our alternative models, we studied cases (a)  = 0.10
(N = 120), (b)  = 0.15 (N = 114) and (c)  = 0.25 (N = 94).10 In case (c) we were
left with a very small sample size, and some of our empirical results were not statistically
significant. In cases (a) and (b) with lower elasticities, our main results were qualitatively
similar to those discussed earlier in this paper. Appendix C provides details.
Our second sensitivity check is related to the fairly small sample size. Because our
main models included only 14 countries, we checked whether some groups of countries
drive the main results. We did these investigations by using the specifications of Table 2,
leaving each country group out of the sample (one group at a time). The countries
were categorised into three groups, as in Figures 2–3. Only after dropping the Anglo-
Saxon countries from the sample did we find that Ginif was very nonlinearly linked to
RDGini;relative.11 Otherwise, we found that our main findings on factor-income inequality
and redistributive preference variables are fairly robust.
Table 3: Sensitivity checks: alternative additive model specifications. All models have N = 105. The
coefficients (and standard errors) are provided for the linear terms. Figure 5 shows graphs of the reported
smooth functions that are not linear.
Alternative If as explanatory variable Alternative definition of RD
Depending variable: Depending variable:
RDGini;relative RDP90/P50;relative RDGini;absolute RDP90/P50;absolute
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Ginif - f(Ginif )*** f(Ginif )*** -
See Fig. 5(a) See Fig. 5(b)
P90/P50f 3.545** - - f(P90/P50f )***
(1.709) See Fig. 5(d)
γ{=0.20} f(γ)** -4.697** -1.342* -0.060’
See Fig. 5(c) (1.988) (0.704) (0.040)
***, **, *, ’ indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 15% levels, respectively.
Note: The smooth terms’ significance levels are based on approximate F-tests.
All models include country dummies and the following controls (some enter the model in nonlinear form):
share of government employment, dependency rate, openness, unemployment rate, trade union density and
a flexible term for year.
10As the elasticity increases, the number of observations in our data set decreases. This happens
because we are limited to using values γ ≥ 0.
11To be precise, when only the Nordic and Continental European countries were included in the sample,
the association between RDGini;relative and Ginif resembled the letter M.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the smooth functions f in the additive models of Table 3. The plots also show
the 95% confidence bands (dashed) and the covariate values as a rug plot along the horizontal axis.
As a third sensitivity check, we estimated models where we did not use the same
inequality indicator on both sides of the estimation equation. That is, we tested models
with the alternative factor-income inequality measure. Table 3 reports two examples
of these specifications, see models (9) and (10). Both models’ results are qualitatively
similar to our main findings in Table 2; factor-income inequality is positively linked with
redistribution, whereas γ is negatively associated with redistribution.
Finally, we checked how our results change if the extent of redistribution is measured
in absolute terms. Table 3 reports models (11) and (12) where RDI;absolute = If − Id is
the dependent variable. Again, the results are qualitatively similar to our main findings.
4. Conclusions
This paper examined the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the
components of the Mirrlees model. To describe income inequality and redistribution,
we used the Gini coefficients and the P90/P50 percentile ratios calculated from the LIS
database. We also collected data from various other sources and constructed a measure
of redistributive preferences by utilising the optimal top tax formula. Instead of relying
solely on linear specifications in our empirical models, we also utilised penalized spline
methods to allow nonlinearities in a flexible manner. We found a positive link between
17
inherent (factor-income) inequality and the extent of redistribution. Moreover, we found
a significant association between the extent of redistribution and government’s taste for
redistribution. These empirical results are qualitatively in line with the Mirrlees model.
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics and data sources
Table A.4: Summary statistics of data used in models of Tables 2–3. Data sources are listed below.
Variable N min mean max
redistribution: RDGini;relative 105 23.61 36.71 55.62
redistribution: RDP90/P50;relative 105 5.52 20.25 46.25
Ginif 105 38.30 47.14 57.50
P90/P50f 105 1.92 2.38 3.58
redistributive preferences γ{=0.20} 105 0.05 0.52 0.84
government employment 105 9.33 19.15 33.65
dependency rate 105 30.30 33.53 39.55
openness 105 16.41 62.71 190.11
unemployment rate 105 1.01 8.36 26.19
trade union density 105 7.67 35.06 83.14
redistribution: RDGini;absolute 105 9.60 17.35 27.90
redistribution: RDP90/P50;absolute 105 0.11 0.49 1.66
List of data sources and definitions:
• Income inequality (I): Ginif , Ginid, P90/P50f and P90/P50d are from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) database (2017); subscript ‘f ’ refers to factor incomes and ‘d’ to disposable incomes.
• Redistribution: calculated using the If and Id variables (described above). Absolute measures
calculated as RDI;absolute = If − Id, and relative measures calculated as
RDI;relative = 100(If − Id)/If .
• Redistributive preference γ, using the optimal top tax formula
τ = (1− γ)/(1− γ + α)⇔ γ = 1− τα/(1− τ).
Top income tax rates (τ) from Piketty et al. (2014), OECD (2017) and the Association of
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (2017): Piketty et al. data are used for years up to 2010;
the OECD data are used to extend series up to 2013; as an exception, the whole Finnish series
has been updated using data from the OECD and the Association of Finnish Local and Regional
Authorities. Pareto coefficients (α) are calculated using the relative shares of top 10% and top
1% income shares from the World Inequality Database (2017). These two series were available
for all countries in our sample. To create longer series without breaks, we have imputed data in
two cases: (1) when the top income share series begins (ends) one year later (earlier) compared
to our data from the LIS database, we repeat the closest value for that year; (2) when there are
at most three consecutive observations missing in the series, but we have data from the LIS
database, we use linear interpolation. We assume constant elasticity and study cases
 = {0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25}; in our preferred specifications we assume  = 0.20.
• Government employment as per cent of total employment. Source: OECD (2016, 2017) and
Eurostat (2017).
• Dependency rate: share of population who are 14 years or under or 65 years or over, as per cent
of total population. Source: OECD (2017).
• Openness: the sum of exports and imports as per cent of GDP. Source: OECD (2017).
• Unemployment rate as per cent of civilian labour force. Source: OECD (2017).
• Trade union density, as percentage. Source: OECD (2017).
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Appendix B. Additional descriptive figure of RDP90/P50
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Figure B.6: Evolution of the extent of redistribution when redistribution is measured in relative terms:
RDP90/P50;relative (14 advanced countries, unbalanced data, years 1967–2013). Calculations based on
LIS database. More information can be found in Appendix A.
Appendix C. Sensitivity of results with respect to chosen 
Table C.5: Sensitivity checks: alternative values for the elasticity parameter . This table provides
selected results of additive model specifications. The coefficients (and standard errors) are provided for
the linear terms. Figure C.7 shows graphs of the smooth functions that are not linear.
Depending variable: RDGini;relative Depending variable: RDP90/P50;relative
 = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.25  = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.25
N = 120 N = 114 N = 94 N = 120 N = 114 N = 94
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Ginif f(Ginif )’ f(Ginif )*** f(Ginif )*** - - -
See Fig. C.7(a) See Fig. C.7(b) See Fig. C.7(c)
P90/P50f - - - 22.078*** 22.163*** 21.765***
(1.477) (1.472) (1.588)
γ{} -4.999* -5.596** 0.050 -6.399*** -3.609** 2.041
(2.694) (2.309) (2.058) (2.018) (1.657) (2.153)
***, **, *, ’ indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 15% levels, respectively.
Note: The smooth terms’ significance levels are based on approximate F-tests.
All models include country dummies and the following controls (some enter the model in nonlinear form):
share of government employment, dependency rate, openness, unemployment rate, trade union density and
a flexible term for year.
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Figure C.7: Illustration of the smooth functions f in the additive models of Table C.5. The plots also
show the 95% confidence bands (dashed) and the covariate values as a rug plot along the horizontal axis.
Appendix D. Supplementary information about the estimation method
Consider a model containing only one smooth function of one covariate: yi = f(xi) + i, where i
are i.i.d. N(0, σ2) random variables. To estimate function f here, f is represented so that the model
becomes a linear model. This is possible by choosing a basis, defining the space of functions of which f
(or a close approximation to it) is an element. In practice, one chooses basis functions, which are treated
as known.
Assume that the function f has a representation f(x) =
∑k
j=1 bj(x)βj , where βj are unknown
parameters and bj(x) are known basis functions. Using a chosen basis for f implies that we have a
linear model y = Xβ + , where the model matrix X can be represented using basis functions such
as those in the cubic regression spline basis. The departure from smoothness can be penalized with∫
f ′′(x)2dx. The penalty
∫
f ′′(x)2dx can be expressed as βTSβ, where S is a coefficient matrix that can
be expressed in terms of the known basis functions.
Accordingly, the penalized regression spline fitting problem is to minimise ‖y−Xβ‖2 + λβTSβ,
with respect to β. The problem of estimating the degree of smoothness is a problem of estimating
the smoothing parameter λ. In the estimation, one faces a bias–variance trade-off: on the one hand,
the bias should be small, but on the other hand, the fit should be smooth. One needs to compromise
between the two extremes. λ −→ ∞ results in a straight line estimate for f , and λ = 0 leads to an
unpenalized regression spline estimate. The penalized least squares estimator of β, given λ, is βˆ =
(XTX + λS)−1XTy. Thus, the expected value vector is estimated as Ê(y) = µˆ = Ay, where A =
X(XTX + λS)−1XT is called an influence matrix.
This setting can be augmented to include several covariates and smooths. Given a basis, an additive
model is simply a linear model with one or more associated penalties. The size of basis dimension for
each smooth is usually not critical in estimation, because it only sets an upper limit on the flexibility
of a term. Smoothing parameters control the effective degrees of freedom, and the effective degrees of
freedom can be used to measure the flexibility of a model. See Wood (2006) for more discussion.
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